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Johnson v. State, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 73 (Oct. 5, 2017) (en banc)1
CRIMINAL APPEALS: DEATH PENALTY
Summary
When the Court reverses a death sentence on direct appeal and remands for a new penalty
hearing, there is no longer a final judgment that triggers the one-year period set forth in NRS
34.726(1) for filing a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Background
In 1998, a jury convicted Donte Johnson of numerous felonies, including four counts of
first-degree murder. After a second penalty hearing, a three-judge panel imposed four death
sentences for each murder. On direct appeal, the Court found the three-judge panel procedure
unconstitutional, and vacated all death sentences.2 After a third penalty hearing, a jury
unanimously imposed death sentences for each murder. The Court affirmed the four sentences on
direct appeal from the newly imposed judgment of conviction.3
Johnson filed his post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus within one year after
remittitur from Johnson II. Johnson challenged counsel’s performance during the 2000 trial and
the 2005 penalty remand, as well as the appeals in Johnson I and Johnson II. The State contended
that NRS 34.726(1)4 barred claims of ineffective-assistance of counsel relating to the 2000 trial
and Johnson I because Johnson did not raise them within one year after remittitur issued from
Johnson I. The district court concluded that the one-year period in NRS 34.726(1) did not begin
until Johnson’s judgment of conviction became final after this Court affirmed his death sentences
from the direct appeal in Johnson II. This appeal followed.
Discussion
Nevada’s postconviction scheme contemplates filing one petition from a final judgment of
conviction
NRS 34.726(1) states that a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus “must be
filed within 1 year after entry of the judgment of conviction or, if an appeal had been taken from
the judgment, within 1 year after the appellate court . . . issues remittitur.”5 The Court has
previously held that this statute requires a final judgment to prompt the one-year period.6 Here,
parties disputed when Johnson’s conviction became final for the purposes of the statute. The Court
agreed with Johnson’s position that the statutory and legislative intent behind the post-conviction
scheme calls for a single petition challenging convictions and sentences. Because Johnson’s
judgment of conviction was not final until settlement of sentences on remand (Johnson I), the one1
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year period did not begin until remittitur issued from Johnson II. The Court additionally relied on
Whitehead,7 to address policy concerns such as endorsing a rule that would undermine the
legislative intent of post-conviction habeas provisions.
Thus, the Court agreed with the district court that NRS 34.726(1) did not bar Johnson’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claims relating to his 2000 and 2005 trials or the direct appeals
from those convictions.8
The district court correctly denied the claims raised in Johnson’s petition
To determine whether the district court correctly denied Johnson’s claim, the Court relied
on the two-part test established by Strickland v. Washington, which requires “a petitioner
demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
(deficient performance) and a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance,
the outcome of the proceedings would have been different (prejudice).” 9 If a petitioner
demonstrates sufficient probability to weaken confidence in the outcome, reasonable probability
is established.10 The Strickland test is additionally applicable to appellate-counsel claims,11 though
it considers the restraints of the appellate process that require counsel to make decisions as to
which claims will be argued and which are ignored.
Johnson failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the 2000
jury trial or in the related appeal (Johnson I)
Jury selection
Johnson argued that his appellate counsel should have raised several challenges to the jury
selection process. However, the Court concluded that he failed to show deficient performance and
prejudice because he did not establish that issues ignored by counsel were clearly stronger than
others raised, or that they had a reasonable probability of success on appeal.
Unrecorded bench conferences
Johnson contended that trial counsel should have ensured the recording of all bench
conferences or maintained better documentation of unrecorded conferences. The Court rejected
this because even if an objectively reasonable attorney would have taken these actions, he provided
no explanation how the trial result would have differed but for counsel’s performance.
Admission of evidence
Johnson argued that counsel should have challenged various evidentiary decisions,
including the trial court’s: 1) decision to admit autopsy photographs; 2) ruling precluding him from
questioning a witness’s bias; 3) admittance of testimony that he sold drugs and; 4) admittance of
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testimony that he heard another witness tell the police “we knew who did it.” The Court concluded
that Johnson failed to establish a reasonable probability that these issues would succeed on appeal,
or how they were clearly stronger in comparison to other issues raised by appellate counsel.
Prosecutorial misconduct
The Court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Johnson’s ineffective
counsel claim. Johnson argued appellate counsel should have contemplated prosecutorial
misconduct, but he failed to show deficient performance or prejudice. Johnson also did not explain
why a reasonable attorney would have raised the specific issues he emphasized, instead of others.
Moreover, none of these issues had a reasonable probability of success on appeal.
Kidnapping offenses
The Court rejected Johnson’s contention because he failed to explain how counsel should
have challenged the kidnapping charges as incidental to the robbery charges. Again, Johnson failed
to show deficient performance or prejudice. Further, the facts of the present case did not allow for
a reasonable probability that counsel could have successfully disputed the kidnapping charges.12
Improper defense comments
The Court additionally rejected Johnson’s contention that counsel provided ineffective
assistance by referring to the victims as kids during closing argument. The Court had previously
held that describing them as such is not improper given their youth,13 even in light of the trial
court’s granting of counsel’s motion in limine to prohibit the use of the term.
Jury instructions
Johnson argued that counsel should have challenged the coconspirator liability instruction,
and the premeditation and reasonable doubt instructions. He further argued that trial counsel
should have offered an additional instruction on express and implied malice. The Court concluded
that Johnson failed to demonstrate deficient performance.
With respect to the coconspirator instruction, Johnson did not receive a coconspirator
charge; thus, the instruction was not necessary to instruct the jury of the intent required to find him
guilty of kidnapping. The premeditation and reasonable doubt instructions acted in accordance to
the law,14 therefore appellate counsel had no basis to challenge.
Lastly, in consideration of the overwhelming evidence showing Johnson was guilty of firstdegree murder pursuant to NRS 200.030(1),15 he failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability
that had the jury received different instructions, they would return a different verdict.
Johnson failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the
2005 penalty hearing and related appeal (Johnson II)
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Bifurcation of the 2005 penalty hearing
Johnson failed to show deficient performance of counsel when he argued that counsel
should not have made a request for a bifurcated penalty hearing. Though trial counsel testified that
the request was a strategic decision, Johnson did not demonstrate that counsel’s strategy fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.16 Further, he did not demonstrate a reasonable probability
of a different outcome but for counsel’s successful strategy.
Additional mitigating evidence
Johnson argued that trial counsel inadequately investigated and should have presented
additional mitigating evidence with respect to other circumstances in his social history. Under
Strickland, “counsel has the duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”17 Here, testimony at the evidentiary
hearing supported the reasonableness of counsel’s decisions with respect to their investigation and
presented evidence. Because Johnson failed to identify what testimony counsel should have
presented at the hearing,18 he further failed to demonstrate deficient performance and prejudice.
Evidence of codefendants’ sentences
Johnson failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that his sentence would differ
had the jury heard of his co-conspirators lesser sentences. Though he argued that trial counsel
should have raised this evidence, a reasonable attorney may have similarly ignored presenting this
evidence to avoid reinforcing the State’s argument that Johnson was deserving of a harsher
sentence because of his heightened role in the crimes.19
First penalty hearing mitigating circumstances
Johnson failed to show deficient performance and prejudice when he argued that trial
counsel should have provided the jury at his 2005 penalty hearing with all mitigating
circumstances presented at his first penalty hearing. Johnson did not demonstrate that this
instruction was proper given that the jurors at the 2005 penalty hearing heard evidence of the most
concerning mitigating circumstances. Further, the judge instructed the jury as to their ability to
find any other mitigation, including circumstances not specifically listed. Jurors at the 2005 penalty
hearing had the duty to decide what mitigation existed and the weight given to the mitigation
evidence presented.20
Impeachment of defense witnesses
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Trial counsel has an obligation to make a reasonable investigation into mitigating evidence
or a reasonable decision that renders an investigation unnecessary.21 In the present case, Johnson’s
argument that trial counsel should not have caused the mitigation expert to prepare a report, and
that both counsel should have challenged the State’s use of the expert’s report to impeach a defense
mental health expert, failed. The Court concluded that decision by counsel was not unreasonable.
Further, the State has the right to investigate an expert’s opinion;22 here, Johnson failed to identify
any basis on which counsel could have challenged the report’s use.
Johnson also argued that appellate counsel should have challenged the prosecutor’s
impeachment of a defense witness by inquiring about a misdemeanor conviction. However, the
trial court relieved any prejudice by sustaining a defense objection and instructing the jury to
disregard the exchange;23 thus, the Court rejected this argument.
Disagreement between trial counsel
Here, with respect to his complaint that counsel contradicted each other in closing
argument, the Court concluded that Johnson again failed to demonstrate ineffective counsel.
Counsel explained at the evidentiary hearing that she sought to preserve the defense’s credibility
by challenging co-counsel’s statement. Additionally, Johnson did not show prejudice because it
was unlikely that a more consistent argument by counsel would have changed the result.
Jury instruction
The Court concluded that Johnson failed to show deficient performance and prejudice
when he argued that trial counsel should have requested an instruction advising the jury that one
juror may find a mitigating circumstance. Here, instructions and special verdict forms made this
point clear. Trial counsel’s failure to request an additional instruction did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Further, because there is no clear probability that the jurors
did not comprehend that they could make an individual determination, there was no reasonable
probability of a different outcome at the penalty phase but for failure to request an additional
instruction.24
Conclusion
The Court affirmed the district court’s decision, and concluded it did not err in denying
Johnson’s petition, predicated on the district court’s consideration and denial of Johnson’s postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the merits in his death penalty case.
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